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Abstract 
Homo Reciprocans: Survey Evidence on Behavioural Outcomes 
 
This paper complements the experimental literature that has shown the 
importance of reciprocity for behaviour in stylized labour markets or other 
decision settings. We use individual measures of reciprocal inclinations in a 
large, representative survey, and relate reciprocity to real world labour market 
behaviour and life outcomes. We find that reciprocity matters, and we find that 
the way in which it matters is very much in line with the experimental evidence. 
In particular, positive reciprocity is associated with receiving higher wages and 
working harder. Negatively reciprocal inclinations tend to reduce effort. Firms 
do not pay lower wages to individuals with strong negatively reciprocal 
inclinations. Instead, negative reciprocity increases the likelihood of being 
unemployed. Looking at broader measures of success, in terms of number of 
close friends, and subjective well-being, we find that positively reciprocal 
inclination are associated with greater happiness and ability to sustain friendship 
relations, with the opposite being true for negative reciprocity. 
 
Keywords: Reciprocity, Trust, SOEP, Wage regression, Unemployment, 
 Happiness 
JEL codes: D63, J3, J6. 
 
Thomas Dohmen 
ROA, IZA, DIW 
P.O. Box 616 
6200 MD Maastricht 
The Netherlands 
t.dohmen@roa.unimaas.nl 
 
Armin Falk 
University of Bonn, IZA, CEPR, DIW 
Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9 
53113 Bonn 
Germany 
armin.falk@uni-bonn.de 
 
David Huffman 
Swarthmore College and IZA 
Department of Economics  
Swarthmore College 
500 College Avenue 
Swarthmore, PA 19081-1397 
dhuffma1@swarthmore.edu 
USA 
Uwe Sunde 
The Swiss Institute for Empirical 
Economic Research SEW-HSG 
Varnbüelstrasse 14 
9000 St. Gallen 
uwe.sunde@unisg.ch 
Switzerland 
 
  
op
b
e
g
o
u
m
sINTRODUCTIONReciprocity is an in-kind response to friendly or hostile acts. Homo economicus would
never engage in reciprocal behavior, as long as it does not advance material self interest.
An alternative model is homo reciprocans, for whom reciprocal behaviour is driven by recip-
rocal motivations: direct utility value placed on rewarding or punishing (Rabin, 1993; Falk
and Fischbacher, 2006). Conceptually, one can distinguish between positive reciprocity, the
degree to which an individual rewards kind actions, and negative reciprocity, the extent to
which the individual punishes unkind actions. Positive reciprocity has been demonstrated
in experimental settings where contracts are incomplete, and workers reciprocate generous
wages with high effort, even though there is no way to enforce contracts (Fehr, Kirchsteiger
and Riedl, 1993; Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004). Positive reciprocity can also explain why peo-
ple reward trust in the well-known trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995; Falk and
Zehnder, 2007). Negative reciprocity is relevant in bargaining games, for example in terms
of willingness to reject unfair offers even at a personal cost (see, e.g., Gu¨th, Schmittberger
and Schwarze, 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995), and for willingness to punish others who
violate norms of cooperation or fairness in public goods games (see, e.g., Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2000; Carpenter and Seki, 2005).
While experimental evidence has shown the behavioural relevance of reciprocity in lab-
ratory settings, there is less evidence for the role of reciprocity outside the lab. The ex-
erimental approach is valuable for the ability to provide closely controlled measures of
ehaviour. For example, relevant payoffs and information conditions are controlled by the
xperimenter, and the experimenter can vary the one-shot versus repeated nature of the
ame, to distinguish between reciprocal behaviour based on reciprocal motivation or based
n strategic considerations. In this paper we take an alternative approach, using individ-
al measures of reciprocal inclinations in a large representative survey, and relating these
easures to actual labour market behaviour and other life outcomes. A key advantage of
urvey measures is the ability to study reciprocity for a large representative subject pool.
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Paid experiments are typically restricted to much smaller samples of college students. A
large survey also affords the statistical power necessary to investigate how reciprocity is
related to various behaviours and life outcomes. As is always the case in empirical stud-
ies without the luxury of natural experiments, the evidence takes the form of correlations.
However, even correlations are interesting in this case, given that the experimental litera-
ture provides directed hypotheses that can be falsified using correlations. Furthermore, it is
difficult to argue for reverse causality for most of the outcomes we consider. For example,
it is unlikely that working overtime makes someone more positively reciprocal. Finally, we
use longitudinal data and show that reciprocal inclinations predict not only current but also
future economic outcomes, such as unemployment or life-satisfaction. This is suggestive of
a causal relationship because future outcomes are unlikely to affect current measurement of
reciprocity.
We first investigate the prevalence of positive and negative reciprocal inclinations in the
population, and test whether these are part of the same underlying trait or instead reflect
separate traits. Theoretically, reciprocity has typically been assumed to be a single trait,
i.e., someone who is strongly inclined to reward kind actions is assumed to be someone who
is also strongly inclined to punish unkind actions. In the model of Falk and Fischbacher
(2006), for example, a single parameter ρ is assumed to capture willingness to reciprocate
regardless of whether reciprocation involves punishment or reward. If this assumption is
approximately correct, one would expect to find a strong correlation between the degree of
positive and negative reciprocity for an individual. If there is little correlation, it suggests
that these are actually separate traits, and that theories of reciprocity should incorporate
separate parameters for positive and negative reciprocity.
One of the main findings from the experimental literature on reciprocity concerns worker
behaviour in stylized labour markets. Numerous studies, both theoretical and empirical,
have argued that positive reciprocity can explain why workers perform even when they
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have ample opportunity for shirking (see, e.g., Akerlof, 1982; Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl,
1993; Bewley, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 1999). In other words, it is hypothesized that there is
a positive correlation between the strength of a worker’s positively reciprocal inclinations
and the extent to which the worker responds to a generous wage by working hard. To
the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to test this claim on the basis of a large
survey.1 We measure work effort using data on overtime hours worked. We show that
positive reciprocal inclinations are positively associated with working overtime while the
reverse holds for negative reciprocity. Moreover we use a survey question that asks whether
a worker thinks his wage is fair and test whether reciprocity affects the way the worker
responds to having a fair or unfair wage. Positive reciprocity is hypothesized to determine
the positive effort response to a fair wage. The results are strikingly consistent with this
hypothesis, lending support to the generalizability of lab findings.
We next consider how employers treat workers depending on workers’ reciprocal incli-
nations. Experimental evidence suggests that in settings with incomplete contracts, firms
increase wages as they learn that a worker is willing to reciprocate with higher effort. For
example, Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) show that successful labour relationships under in-
complete contracts begin with a period of gradually increasing wages and worker effort, i.e.,
a buildup of trust and reciprocal interactions. For workers who are not positively reciprocal,
the firm does not have an incentive to increase the wage. To the extent that firms can learn
about worker types, we should thus observe that positively reciprocal workers tend to receive
higher wages. On the other hand, there are reasons to think that firms will not discriminate
against negatively reciprocal workers with lower wages. Indeed, the more negatively recip-
rocal a worker is, the more dangerous it is to pay a low wage for fear of triggering sanctions.
Rather than cut the wage of a negatively reciprocal worker, it may be better to dismiss
1 Interesting related evidence is provided by Clark et al. (2006), who show that a survey question about
willingness to put in effort on the job above and beyond the call of duty is positively correlated with the
income paid by the employer.
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the worker, as argued by Bewley (1999). This would imply a role for negative reciprocity
along the margin of employment versus unemployment: negatively reciprocal types should
be more likely to be unemployed. Increasing positive reciprocity, on the other hand, should
be associated with increasing probability of being employed, consistent with experimental
evidence on the benefits of positive reciprocity for sustaining long-term relationships (Brown,
Falk and Fehr, 2004). These predictions are borne out by the data.
We then turn to the question of whether reciprocal inclinations tend to foster individ-
ual success. Since reciprocal individuals are willing to reward and sanction fair or unfair
behaviour even if this is costly, one might speculate that such behaviour could lead to a
strategic disadvantage, because of resources “wasted” on rewards and sanctions. On the
other hand, it is known from evolutionary game theory that if types can be signaled it can
be an advantage to credibly signal that one is willing to punish unfair behaviour or to reward
fair treatments. For example, firms that expect reciprocal actions by their workers may have
a reason to pay higher wages or to treat workers with respect (Akerlof, 1982; Bewley, 1999).
Likewise, teams consisting of a sufficient number of reciprocators will find it easier to enforce
the voluntary provision of public goods, which may result in higher efficiency (Fehr and
Ga¨chter, 2000). Assessing the implications of reciprocity requires evidence on life outcomes
from outside of the lab.
Our analysis of wage and unemployment outcomes provides a first piece of evidence on
the success of reciprocity as an individual trait. We investigate the issue further by taking
a broader perspective on success, showing that reciprocal types have a larger number of
close friends, and a higher degree of subjective well-being. The latter finding is particularly
relevant because many social scientists agree that happiness is an important goal of human
life and perhaps best summarizes success and achievement in a general way (Frey and Stutzer,
2002).
In sum our results show the economic relevance of reciprocity, and complement pre-
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vious laboratory findings by providing strong corroboration for the relationships between
reciprocity and labour market outcomes typically observed in more stylized experimental
settings. Moreover, we are able to address the question how reciprocity translates into life
success, and find that positively reciprocal people have more close friends, and a higher
overall level of life satisfaction. In this sense, Homo Reciprocans – in the positive domain –
is in fact more successful than his or her non-reciprocal fellows. On a more general level our
results show that non-cognitive skills, such as reciprocity, can have strong and systematic
effects on economic outcomes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the data,
and provide descriptive statistics regarding the reciprocity measures. Section 2 explores
consequences of reciprocity: worker effort, wage levels and employment as well as measures
of individual success, in terms of number of close friends and happiness. Section 3 concludes.
1 Data
Our data come from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). The SOEP is a
representative panel survey of the resident population of Germany (for a detailed description,
see Wagner et al., 1993, and Schupp and Wagner, 2002). The initial wave of the survey was
conducted in 1984.2 The SOEP surveys the head of each household in the sample, but also
gives the full survey to all other household members over the age of 17. Respondents are
asked for a wide range of personal and household information, and for their attitudes on
assorted topics, including political and social issues.
The 2005 wave of the survey, which includes 21,105 individuals from 11,453 households,
contains questions about positive and negative reciprocity. These questions are based on the
measure developed by Perugini et al. (2003) and were included in the SOEP for the first
2 The panel was extended to include East Germany in 1990, after reunification. For more details on the
SOEP, see www.diw.de/gsoep/.
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time. Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how well each of the following
six statements (translated from German) applies to them personally: (1) If someone does
me a favour, I am prepared to return it; (2) If I suffer a serious wrong, I will take revenge as
soon as possible, no matter what the cost; (3) If somebody puts me in a difficult position, I
will do the same to him/her; (4) I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind
to me before; (5) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back; (6) I am ready to
undergo personal costs to help somebody who helped me before.3 An answer of 1 on the
scale means: “does not apply to me at all” and choosing 7 means: “applies to me perfectly”.
Questions (1), (4) and (6) ask about positive reciprocity, while questions (2), (3) and (5) ask
about negative reciprocity. Also, two of the questions ask explicitly whether the respondent
would incur costs in order to be negatively reciprocal (question 2) or positively reciprocal
(question 6). In total, 20,774 individuals responded to all six reciprocity measures.4 It is
noteworthy that the measures do not mention strategic reasons for behaving reciprocally.
Therefore it seems likely that respondents report reciprocity that reflects a taste for reciprocal
behavior, as is assumed in the homo reciprocans model. Thus, we hypothesize that our results
on behavioral outcomes will turn out to be consistent with findings from lab experiments
that typically measure reciprocity in one-shot, non-strategic settings. A disadvantage of
the survey measures, however, is that there is less control and there is always a role for
responders to interpret the measures in their own way. This means that it is not perfectly
possible to disentangle reciprocal motivation from reciprocal behavior.
Based on experimental evidence, we would predict substantial heterogeneity in recip-
rocal inclinations. Although a substantial fraction of subjects in experiments are observed
to engage in reciprocal behavior, the degree of reciprocity varies widely, and a non-trival
3 German versions of all six questions are available online, at the following web site:
www.diw.de/deutsch/sop/service/fragen/fr2005/personen 2005.pdf. The word “offend” is translated into
German as “beleidigen”, which has a strong negative connotation.
4 The response rate is very high, and quite similar, across the individual questions. For each question, we
observe responses from at least 99 percent of the 21,105 individuals in the sample.
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proportion typically shows no signs of reciprocal behaviour at all (see Fehr and Ga¨chter,
2000).5
Figure 1 shows the distributions of answers to each of the six different reciprocity mea-
sures. A first observation is that most people indicate some degree of positive reciprocity. For
each of the three positive reciprocity statements, less than 5 percent say that the statement
does not apply to them at all. The modal response is a 6 or 7 for all three statements, indi-
cating that a substantial number of people report that the statement applies to them almost
perfectly. As expected there is substantial heterogeneity, however, with a fraction ranging
from about 15 to 40 percent stating some other, intermediate level of agreement, depending
on the measure. For negative reciprocity, the modal response is 1 or 2, corresponding to zero
or only mild negatively reciprocal inclinations. However, compared to positive reciprocity,
there is even greater variance within each measure. For each of the questions, a substantial
number of individuals, roughly 50 percent, report an intermediate level of agreement that
they are negatively reciprocal, from 3 to 5. There is also a non-trivial fraction, roughly 10
percent for each question, who choose a 6 or 7, indicating almost complete agreement with
even the strongest statements about negative reciprocity. Thus, it appears that some degree
of reciprocal inclinations is pervasive in the population, particularly for positive reciprocity,
but that there is heterogeneity.
Agreement with positive reciprocity statements appears to be decreasing in the level of
the cost associated with supporting others mentioned in the question. This is consistent with
essentially all theoretical models of reciprocity, which typically assume that an individual
cares about own material well being (e.g., Rabin, 1993, Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). It
is also predicted based on laboratory evidence, which shows that willingness to reciprocate
decreases in the costs of doing so (Quervaine et al., 2004; Falk et al., 2005). For example,
5 Understanding what proportion of the general population has reciprocal inclinations is useful, given that
the prevalence of reciprocal types in the population as well as market institutions are crucial in determining
whether reciprocal or nonreciprocal behaviour dominates in the market equilibrium (Falk and Fischbacher,
2006).
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the top panel for positive reciprocity shows that more than 60 percent fully agree that they
are willing to return a favour, but this drops to around 35 percent in the middle panel,
where the statement mentions having to go out of one’s way, and to only 22 percent in the
bottom panel, for the statement that explicitly mentions having to undergo personal costs.
For negative reciprocity, there is less evidence that willingness to reciprocate depends on the
costs associated with punishment; the distribution is quite similar across the three different
statements. This could indicate that people are less sensitive to costs when it comes to
punishing, or that the different statements also involve differences in the psychic rewards for
punishing.6
In order to get a sense of individuals’ overall tendency to be positively or negatively
reciprocal, we average responses over the three positive and negative statements, respectively.
Figure 2 shows the distributions of these averages.7 The qualitative message is unchanged
by collapsing the individual measures of positive and negative reciprocity in this way. Most
people report substantial inclination to be positively reciprocal, but there is still variation.
For negative reciprocity there is more variation, such that many people report only weak
agreement with negative reciprocity statements on average, but a non-trivial fraction report
almost complete agreement. In our analysis later on, we will focus on these overall measures
of positive and negative reciprocity for each individual.
The correlation between positive and negative reciprocity is only 0.021, suggesting that
these are not part of a single trait. In other words, just because someone is strongly nega-
tively reciprocal does not mean that they are strongly positively reciprocal, and vice versa.
This finding has implications for modeling reciprocity. As discussed in the introduction,
6 For example, the statement that involves taking revenge at any cost also states that this is in response to
a serious wrong. The statement about reciprocating an insult does not mention a cost, but redressing an
insult may be less important than responding to a serious wrong, potentially explaining why willingness
to reciprocate is similar in these two situations.
7 Note that the bins do not correspond to integer values because they are constructed using averages of
different values on the response scales. Means and standard deviations for positive and negative reciprocity
are 5.88 (0.91) and 3.11 (1.46), respectively.
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reciprocity is usually modeled with a single parameter, whereas the weak link between pos-
itive and negative reciprocity suggests that a more appropriate specification would include
two parameters. It is in fact quite plausible that positive and negative reciprocity could be
separate traits, when one considers potential underlying mechanisms. For instance, anger
has been shown to be a correlate of strong negative reciprocity (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002). Al-
though there is little evidence on the specific emotions associated with positive reciprocity,
the emotions associated with positive reciprocity are presumably different than those for
negative reciprocity, which is suggestive of a different mechanism.
An alternative way of condensing the information in the reciprocity survey questions is
to apply principal components analysis. Principal components analysis on the reciprocity
questions reveals that the six survey questions can be represented by two distinct, orthogo-
nal, components with eigenvalues larger than one. Questions about positive reciprocity have
high loadings on the first component while questions on negative reciprocity have remark-
ably low loadings on this component. The reverse is true for the loadings on the second
component.8 This provides further evidence that positive and negative reciprocity are in-
deed distinct traits.9 The evidence is buttressed by the fact that the correlation between the
single component for positive reciprocity that is obtained by a principal component analysis
on the positive reciprocity questions only, and the analogously obtained single component
for negative reciprocity is only 0.014 in the sample of respondents who answered all six
reciprocity questions.10
8 The loadings on the first component (positive reciprocity) are respectively 0.5507, 0.6218 and 0.5532 for
questions (1), (4) and (6) and -0.0226, -0.0528 and -0.0274 for questions (2), (3) and (5). The loadings for
the second component are -0.0407, 0.0683, 0.0712, 0.5849, 0.5937 and 0.5422 for questions (1), (4), (6),
(2), (3) and (5) respectively.
9 All qualitative results obtained for the average measures are very similar to results obtained with principal
components measures for positive and negative reciprocity.
10 Correlations between the two principal components that are obtained from an analysis which uses all six
questions and the components for positive and negative reciprocity that result from an analysis on the
three respective items only corroborate this result: Correlations between components for positive and
negative reciprocity are always smaller than 0.07 in absolute terms while correlations between the two
different components for positive reciprocity and between those for negative reciprocity exceed 0.997.
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In previous research, we have explored the relationship of reciprocity to exogenous indi-
vidual characteristics, including age, gender, and height (Dohmen et al., 2008), as well as the
relationship to another social motivation, trust. For example, females have stronger positive
reciprocal inclinations, and weaker negative reciprocal inclinations, than men. Advancing
age is associated with a similar pattern of more pronounced positive reciprocity and less
pronounced negative reciprocity. Height is also associated with stronger positive reciprocity,
but is unrelated to negative reciprocity. The fact that negative and positive reciprocity
depend on different characteristics in different ways again suggests that these are separate
traits.
2 Behavioral correlates of reciprocity
Guided by the experimental literature, in which studies have often investigated how reci-
procity affects the employment relationship, we first investigate the correlations between
reciprocity and key labour market variables, such as work effort, labour income, and em-
ployment status. We then turn to another important open question: How successful in life
is Homo Reciprocans? We measure success in a variety of ways, including social success
measured by number of close friends, and overall satisfaction with life.
2.1 Reciprocity and work effort
One strand of the experimental literature has documented a willingness of workers to exert
high effort levels, even in settings where effort is not enforceable and a purely selfish worker
would shirk. The leading explanation for such behaviour is that workers are positively
reciprocal, and that firms can elicit high effort levels by paying generous wages. In fact,
firms are observed to pay greater than market clearing wages in these experiments, and
average worker effort levels respond to the level of the wage offered in a way consistent with
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positive reciprocity (see Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Gneezy,
2003). Thus, positive reciprocity can potentially explain why it may be profitable for firms to
pay efficiency wages. Likewise, it has been argued that unfair treatment of employees leads
to shirking or sabotage activities (Fehr and Falk, 1999; Bewley, 1999). With our measures
of reciprocity we provide direct evidence from the field on the worker side of this equation,
testing whether reciprocity is associated with effort levels in the workplace.
Our first measure of work effort is a binary variable indicating whether an employee
worked overtime hours in the month preceding the interview. Interpreting overtime hours
as a measure of additional work effort, we would expect positive coefficients for positive
and negative coefficients for negative reciprocity. In Table 1 we report marginal effects
estimates of Probit models, in which the dependent variable is equal to 1 if an individual
reported working some overtime during the past month and zero otherwise. We report
robust standard errors in brackets, adjusted for clustering on household. The results are in
line with our predictions, i.e., working overtime depends positively on positive and negatively
on negative reciprocity (Column (1)). Given that we have longitudinal data, we can further
check whether reciprocity measured in 2005 predicts work effort not only in 2005 but also
in later years. This would be suggestive of a causal relationship because working overtime
hours in 2006 or 2007 is unlikely to affect measurement of reciprocity in 2005. In Columns
(2) and (3) we therefore present results on how the probability of working overtime in
2006 and 2007 is related to reciprocal inclinations in 2005. It turns out that the effect of
reciprocity on overtime work in later years is similar to its effect on the current probability
of working overtime. For positive reciprocity the effect is actually almost identical. For
negative reciprocity, however, it becomes smaller and insignificant in 2007.
So far we have investigated whether reciprocal inclinations predict effort-related behav-
ior, irrespective of how workers perceive the way they are treated by their firms. This makes
sense because, ceteris paribus, positively reciprocally motivated workers should be more
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likely to provide extra effort while negatively reciprocally motivated workers should provide
less effort. It would be interesting, however, to additionally know whether perceptions of
fairness intensify the effect of reciprocal inclination. Put differently, we would expect that
working overtime depends not only on reciprocal inclination, but also on whether workers
perceive their wages as fair or unfair. The SOEP 2005 wave includes a survey question that
asks whether the respondent thinks that his or her wage is fair or not.11 This measure is
certainly crude in the sense that overall treatment by firms is not only determined by wage
payments but also other aspects such as work environment, career chances, fringe benefits
etc. Moreover, when answering the question about fair wages, respondents may assess overall
fairness of their wage in light of their work effort. Thus finding that reciprocity affects effort
choices depending on answers to the fair wage question would be a strong result.
In Columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 we re-estimate the model presented in Column (1)
of the table on the sub-samples of employees who perceive their wage in 2005 as being
fair (Column (4)) and those who perceive their wage as unfair (Column (5)). Notably,
positive reciprocity has a strong positive effect on working overtime among employees who
perceive their wage as fair. In other words, positively reciprocal employees are more likely
to work overtime if they feel treated in a fair way. For workers who think that their wage is
unfair, reciprocal inclinations have a very small and statistically insignificant effect on the
probability of working overtime. If we interpret less overtime as a form of shirking or lack
of willingness to cooperate in the interest of the firm, the finding that positive reciprocity
only matters when the wage is fair clearly makes sense. Less intuitive, however, is the fact
that negative reciprocity does not have a significant effect when employees do not think they
receive a fair wage.
Another measure for work effort is an individual’s frequency of absenteeism. When es-
timating how the number of days an individual has been absent during the previous year is
11 The wording of the question translated from German is “Is the income that you earn at your current job
just, from your point of view?”
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related to reciprocal inclination, we find evidence that positive reciprocity tends to reduce
days of absenteeism while negative reciprocity is associated with more days of absence. These
results are significant in models with standard controls such as log gross labour income, years
of schooling, a quadratic in part-time and full-time experience, gender, occupational status
in public and private sector employment.12 Positively reciprocal inclinations are associated
with taking significantly less sick days, while the opposite holds for negatively reciprocal
inclinations. These results hold for 2005 and 2006.13 However, the results become insignif-
icant when adding controls for occupation, firm size and industry. Overall, our findings on
work effort support the hypothesis that effort levels in the workplace are increasing in pos-
itive reciprocity. There is also evidence that workers’ negatively reciprocal inclinations find
expression through reduced willingness to work overtime, and greater absenteeism.
2.2 Reciprocity, wages, and unemployment probability
We now turn to the hypothesized link between reciprocal inclinations of workers and how
workers are treated by employers. Recall that based on positive reciprocity or gift-exchange
in the labour market, efficiency wage theory predicts higher wages to reciprocating workers
than to non-reciprocating workers (Akerlof, 1982). This hypothesis has been supported in
numerous laboratory experiments. Ga¨chter and Falk (2002), e.g., study bilateral labour rela-
tions and show that employers gradually increase wage payments as a response to increased
effort levels. As a result workers who are more reciprocal receive higher wages. In light of
the experimental and theoretical work we hypothesize that workers who show a tendency
to reward high wages with high effort, i.e., who are positively reciprocal also receive higher
wages. Table 2 presents Mincer-type earnings regressions where the dependent variable are
12 In order to account for a substantial number of observations with zero days absent, coefficients are esti-
mated using Tobit regressions. In these regressions we exclude observations on those who had a long-term
illness, defined as an illness lasting longer than six weeks.
13 Information on absenteeism is based on retrospective information. In each wave, respondents are asked
for the number of days they were absent at work due to sickness in the previous year, including days of
absence without a medical certificate.
13
different measures of the logarithm of an individual’s gross labour income. In particular, the
dependent variable in Columns (1) to (3) is a measure of log gross monthly labour earnings
in the years 2005 to 2007, while the dependent variable in Columns (4) and (5) measures
log gross annual labour earnings in 2005 and 2006, respectively.14 The regressions are based
on the sub-sample of employees.15 Besides reciprocal inclinations, the controls include infor-
mation on gender, years of education, full-time and part-time experience, tenure, part time,
contractual weekly hours, firm size, industry and occupation.16 The results for labour earn-
ings in 2005 (see Columns (1) and (4)) are consistent with the typical findings for this type
of regression, namely lower labour incomes for women, an increasing and concave experience
effect, and significant education effects. Most interestingly, however, individuals exhibiting
positive reciprocity tend to earn significantly higher labour incomes, regardless of the in-
come measure (monthly or annual). This effect is also economically significant. Moving one
point on the reciprocity scale, and assuming a linear relationship, implies an effect on wages
which is about 10 percent of the size of the gender effect. The results are consistent with
the directed hypothesis from the experimental literature, that positively reciprocal types
should be observed to receive higher wages. To provide further evidence in favor of a causal
interpretation we check whether reciprocity measured in 2005 predicts wages in later years
in addition to predicting the wage in 2005. In Columns (2), (3) and (5) we regress gross
monthly labour income in 2006 and 2007 and annual labour income in 2006, respectively on
reciprocal inclination in 2005. It turns out that the effect of positive reciprocity on future
wages is similar to its effect on current wages, both in terms of size and significance.
Table 2 also shows that negative reciprocity has no significant effect on labour income.
14 Annual labour earnings are taken from the equivalent files of the SOEP, which contain income measures
that are constructed based on retrospective calendar information on monthly labour market status and
monthly earnings, income and benfits. Annual income measures in a particular wave hence refer to income
in the previous year. Since the data for the 2008 wave was not available at the time of writing this paper,
we lack a measure of annual earnings for 2007.
15 We exclude self-employed, retired, unemployed, members of the armed forces, non-participants and persons
still in education.
16 See also the notes of Table 2 for more details.
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This makes sense, given that employers cannot expect negatively reciprocal types to recipro-
cate positively for generous wages, and given that paying low wages to negatively reciprocal
types may be a very bad idea due to potential sanctions.
We next consider the relationship between reciprocity and the likelihood of being unem-
ployed. Experimental and field evidence suggests that positive reciprocity may help sustain
successful employment relationships, and that negative reciprocity may be associated with
relationship dissolution, and unemployment. For example, Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004)
conduct an experiment where long-term relationships can emerge endogenously between a
firm and a worker, and find that positive reciprocity is important for establishing successful
long-term relationships.17 To the extent that positive reciprocity also helps sustain successful
employment relationships outside of the lab, one would then expect that positively reciprocal
individuals are less likely to be unemployed.
On the other hand, there is reason to believe that negatively reciprocal types may be
more likely to be unemployed. Experiments show that people are willing to punish those who
treat them unfairly, even if this is personally costly (see Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Quervaine et
al., 2004). For this reason, negatively reciprocal types might be more likely to quit their job
following unfair treatment by an employer than positively reciprocal types. Alternatively,
negatively reciprocal types might decide to punish the employer by shirking on the job
(see also our findings on absenteeism, discussed above). In this case, the employer has an
incentive to preempt such retaliation by dismissing the worker. One dramatic example of
the damage caused by disgruntled workers is provided by Krueger and Mas (2004). Related
evidence shows that managers of firms are reluctant to cut nominal wages, for fear that this
will trigger negative reciprocity and retaliation from workers (see Bewley, 1999). Thus, it
is quite plausible in the case of conflict that dismissing negatively reciprocal workers seems
17 In the experiment, effort is not enforceable, so short-run self-interest dictates that workers shirk and firms
pay minimal wages. Relationships that ultimately last a long time, however, start with higher wages
and higher effort levels than shorter relationships. Workers earn more in long-term relationships than in
short-term relationships, but also work harder, because they reciprocate the generous wages.
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optimal, as opposed to cutting wages.
In order to test these hypotheses regarding the relationship between unemployment and
reciprocity, Table 3 presents results for an indicator for employment status, equal to 1 if
an individual is currently registered as unemployed, and zero otherwise, as the dependent
variable. Controls include years of education, gender, age, region of residence, and an in-
dicator for German citizenship. The table shows that positively reciprocal individuals are
in fact significantly less likely to be unemployed. On the other hand, negatively reciprocal
individuals are significantly more likely to be unemployed. These findings are consistent
with the hypothesis that individuals’ reciprocal inclinations affect their labour market ex-
perience, in terms of ability or willingness to sustain long-term employment relationships.
They also suggest that employers choose to respond to negative reciprocity on the margin
of employment or unemployment, rather than the margin of adjusting wages (see Bewley,
1999). Again, in terms of magnitude, reciprocity is as important as other key economic
variables. In Column (2) we include region dummies at the state level (Bundesland) as a
further control since unemployment in Germany varies substantially across different regions.
All coefficients remain basically unchanged.
Again it would be reassuring of a causal interpretation if reciprocal inclinations would not
only predict current but also future unemployment. This is why we regress unemployment
in 2006 and 2007 on our 2005 measures of reciprocity in Columns (3) to (6). In Columns
(4) and (6) we also include region dummies. In comparison to current unemployment in
2005, the effects become somewhat smaller for 2006 and 2007. This holds in particular for
positive reciprocity. However, all effects remain significant at least at the 5 percent level for
both positive and negative reciprocity suggesting a causal link from reciprocal inclination to
unemployment.
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2.3 Success of homo reciprocans
In this section we investigate the success of homo reciprocans, by studying how reciprocal
inclinations affect various success measures. This investigation is in line with a growing
literature that focuses on the importance of personality, attitudes, or non-cognitive skills for
determining the economic success of individuals also in an evolutionary context (see Bowles
and Gintis, 2002; Heckman and Rubinstein, 2001; Heckman et al., 2006; Osborne, 2005).
It is also related to recent work investigating whether people who are more generous are
more successful in the sense of having greater life satisfaction (see Konow and Earley, 2008;
Becchetti and Degli, 2007).
There are various reasons why reciprocal behaviour could lead to better or worse out-
comes for an individual. On the one hand, reciprocity is costly, because individuals spend
resources to reciprocate favours or insults, in circumstances where material self-interest would
dictate no response. On the other hand there are potential long-term benefits that could
outweigh these costs, for example, heightened ability to sustain relationships, or ability to
credibly threaten punishment of unfair behaviour. It is therefore interesting to investigate
how Homo Reciprocans fares in life, compared to individuals who are only weakly reciprocal
or not reciprocal at all.18
Our results on labour income and unemployment already indicate that reciprocal incli-
nations are associated with economic success. There is no obvious reason to confine success
only to the economic domain, however. While there are various reasons why reciprocal be-
haviour could lead to better or worse outcomes for an individual, it is clear that reciprocity
works through social interactions. It is therefore informative to also look at other social
outcome variables when gauging the success of homo reciprocans. We use two such out-
comes as measures of success. The first is the number of close friends. This is interesting
18 This is also important from an evolutionary game theoretic perspective that is concerned with explaining
why different types (such as selfish or reciprocal) can coexist (Bowles and Gintis, 2004).
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both because it is an important determinant of individual well-being and social success, and
because it indicates a type of social intelligence, or ability to sustain long-term relationships.
The second is subjective well-being or life satisfaction.
Friendship is known to be associated with various types of positive outcomes for an
individual, including, for example, better health. Social networks have also been linked to
success in finding employment and receiving informal credit. To the extent that reciprocity
sustains or damages friendships, therefore, it has the potential to affect individual well-being.
Column (1) of Table 4 presents regressions where the dependent variable is the number of
“close friends” that an individual reports having.19 Independent variables include the degree
of positive and negative reciprocity for the individual, and the usual exogenous factors as well
as additional controls. The coefficient estimates show that reciprocity does have a strong
effect on friendship relations. Positive reciprocity is associated with a greater number of
close friends, and negative reciprocity is associated with having fewer close friends. Notably,
the impact of reciprocity on the ability to sustain friendship relationships is consistent with
our previous findings on how reciprocity affects the probability of being in another type of
relationship, i.e., being employed. Column (2) adds trust as an additional control to rule
out any confounds working through the correlation between reciprocity and trust. While
trust has a significant positive effect, the coefficient estimates of interest, those of positive
and negative reciprocity, are virtually unchanged: positively reciprocal tendencies facilitate
having more friends, while the opposite is true for negatively reciprocal inclinations. Thus, it
appears to be a robust finding that positive reciprocity and negative reciprocity are helpful
and harmful for sustaining long-term relationships, respectively, whether in the domain of
employment relationships or when considering social relationships such as friendships.
Perhaps the ultimate measure of success for an individual is how satisfied they are,
19 The question about close friends was asked in the 2003 wave, so the regression includes only those indi-
viduals who were also in the survey in 2003. Results are qualitatively similar if we use a Tobit model
instead of OLS.
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subjectively, with their own life. To investigate how reciprocal inclinations affect life sat-
isfaction, we use a standard measure asking the individual to rate satisfaction with their
life on an 11-point scale, where 0 indicates “completely dissatisfied” and 10 indicates “com-
pletely satisfied”. Columns (3) to (5) in Table 4 report regressions where life satisfaction
is the dependent variable. In Column (3) we use data from 2005, while Columns (4) and
(5) use data from 2006 and 2007, respectively. To account for the fact that the dependent
variable is measured in intervals, and thus is left and right censored, coefficients are based
on interval regression. The results are striking: a high level of positive reciprocal attitudes is
associated with greater life satisfaction, while negative reciprocity tends to make individuals
less satisfied with their life. This holds regardless of whether we regress reciprocal inclination
measured in 2005 on current or future levels of life satisfaction (in 2006 and 2007). Notably,
the additional controls all have the effects typically found in life-satisfaction regressions (see,
e.g., van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). For example, women and older individuals
tend to be more satisfied with their lives, marriage has a strong positive effect, and divorce
significantly decreases life satisfaction. As is typically the case, unemployment and a bad
health status have the largest negative effects on life satisfaction of all controls. Higher
education, reflected by having passed the (Abitur) exam, makes individuals more satisfied,
and income as well as higher levels of trust have a significant positive effect on subjective
well-being.20 Also, note that the effects of reciprocity on happiness are quite large. They
are in the same order of magnitude as the gender effect or being married.
3 Concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence that positive and negative reciprocity are associated with
economic outcomes in an asymmetric way. Being positively reciprocal predicts higher work
20 The income variable is logged and comprises all sources of income, including non-labour income and social
support. The results are similar when using a linear specification, or restricting attention to labour income
only.
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effort, lower unemployment, and also higher subjective well-being. Negative reciprocity on
the other hand is associated with a higher frequency of unemployment, and lower levels of
happiness. This result is important because most people in the population have reciprocal
inclinations and differ in the degree to which they are positively or negatively reciprocal.
The fact that reciprocal inclinations are related to subjective well-being is consistent
with recent models of pro-social behaviour based on identity or self-image. In the model
of Benabou and Tirole (2006), for example, individuals gain utility from conforming to
social expectations, or morals, regarding pro-social behaviour. Acting in accordance with
these expectations signals to the individual that they are a good person, and this feeling of
positive self-image yields higher utility. To the extent that there is a social expectation that
people should reciprocate kindness, positive reciprocity has a positive impact on happiness.
This makes people more willing to invest in positive self-image by engaging in positive
reciprocity. To the extent that negative reciprocity, or revenge, is less socially acceptable,
because of conflict with moral rules such as “turning the other cheek”, the long run effect of
negative reciprocity is a lower self image and reduced life satisfaction.
Our findings add to the understanding of reciprocity, which is probably the most impor-
tant type of social preferences. The prevalence of reciprocity calls for an intensified investi-
gation of the economic consequences of reciprocity, e.g., for labour relations and social policy
issues (Bowles and Gintis, 1998). For example, policies that reward people independent of
their contribution to society will most likely be less supported by the public than policies
that account for reciprocal considerations. As an example, take the debate about workfare
vs. welfare. Unlike regular public assistance, workfare requires recipients to spend time on
mandatory activities such as community work, making receipt of benefits conditional on
contribution to society. In the presence of reciprocally motivated taxpayers, who reward
in-kind, we would expect that support in favour of workfare programs where recipients “do
their part” is more pronounced than often assumed.
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In the labour market the existence of reciprocity can also have important implications
for the effects of labour market institutions. For example, minimum wages can play a role as
reference wages, affecting the notion of what constitutes a fair wage. In other words, a given
wage is considered less fair the higher the minimum wage. Therefore, changing the minimum
wage can systematically affect efficiency via effort choices of reciprocally motivated workers
(Card and Krueger, 1995; Falk et al., 2006). Reciprocity can also give rise to efficiency
wages, implying that labour markets are endogenously rigid, i.e., wages do not necessarily
converge to market clearing levels even in the absence of labour market institutions.
The existence of reciprocity also offers new channels for policy interventions, e.g., in the
context of tax evasion. The typical policy recommendation that is based on the assumption
of purely selfish individuals would entail that tax evasion can be reduced by either increasing
fines or detection probabilities. Reciprocity offers an additional perspective. If taxpayers are
reciprocal, i.e., conditionally cooperative, they are more willing to pay taxes if the tax system
is considered as fair and if other tax payers are expected to pay their taxes as well. The
latter argument suggests the existence of two types of equilibria, a good one where people
pay taxes and expect others to pay taxes and a bad one where people don’t pay taxes in the
expectation that others don’t pay their taxes as well. Tax policy could try to reach good
equilibria with the help of expectation management and improving the perceived fairness
and transparency of the tax system.
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Table 1: Reciprocity and Work Effort
Dependent Variable: Worked Overtime Last Month Worked Overtime in 2005
2005 2006 2007 Wage perceived fair Wage perceived not fair
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Positive reciprocity 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.038*** -0.007
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.011]
Negative reciprocity -0.010** -0.008* 0.002 -0.012** -0.009
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.007]
1 if female -0.051*** -0.005 -0.039** -0.051*** -0.059**
[0.014] [0.015] [0.015] [0.018] [0.024]
Years of education 0.006* 0.004 0.007** 0.004 0.007
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.005]
Full-time work experience (in years) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.006** 0.011***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004]
Full-time work experience2/100 -0.018*** -0.013** -0.017*** -0.015** -0.020**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.009]
Part-time work experience (in years) 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.011** 0.011*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.006]
Part-time work experience2/100 -0.034** -0.025* -0.024* -0.040** -0.023
[0.013] [0.014] [0.014] [0.017] [0.023]
Job tenure (in years) -0.006*** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.004* -0.008**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003]
Job tenure2/100 0.011* -0.005 0.011** 0.009 0.013
[0.006] [0.006] [0.005] [0.007] [0.010]
1 if part-time -0.191*** -0.210*** -0.179*** -0.190*** -0.175***
[0.016] [0.017] [0.018] [0.020] [0.027]
Age (in years) -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.007*** -0.004** -0.006**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,462 7,611 7,301 5,626 2,815
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07
The dependent variable is a binary variable, taking the value 1 if an individual reports to have
worked overtime in the past month. Marginal effects estimates of Probit models (evaluated at
the mean of the independent variables) are reported. The measure of positive reciprocity is the
individual’s average level of agreement to three statements concerning, respectively, willingness
to return a favour, to go out of the way to help somebody who was kind, and undergo personal
costs to help someone who was helpful before. The measure of negative reciprocity reflects average
agreement to statements concerning willingness to take revenge for a serious wrong, to retaliate
for being put in a difficult position, and to respond to an insult with an insult. Answers are always
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “does not apply to me at all” and 7 means “applies to
me perfectly”. The sample is split in Columns (4) and (5) based on the response to the question:
“Is the income that you earn at your current job just, from your point of view?” (translated
from German). Regressions in all columns include indicator variables for firm size (5-19, 20-
99, 100-199, 200-1999, more than 2000 employees), industrial sector (agriculture, energy, mining,
manufacturing, construction, trade, transport, bank and insurance), and occupational status in
public and private employment. Detailed results for all control variables s are available upon
request. Robust standard errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level; ***, **, *
indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 2: Reciprocity and Labour Income
Dependent variable: Log Gross Monthly Labour Income Log Gross Annual Labour Income
2005 2006 2007 2005 2006
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Positive reciprocity 0.012** 0.019*** 0.009* 0.018*** 0.016***
[0.005] [0.006] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006]
Negative reciprocity 0.000 -0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.001
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004]
1 if female -0.154*** -0.170*** -0.166*** -0.174*** -0.176***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.013] [0.013] [0.014]
Years of education 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.030*** 0.035*** 0.033***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003 [0.003]
Full-time work experience (in years) 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.030***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Full-time work experience2/100 -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.043*** -0.054*** -0.057***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005]
Part-time work experience (in years) -0.004 -0.001 -0.007** 0.006** 0.008**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Part-time work experience2/100 0.017* 0.000 0.017 -0.018 -0.015
[0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012]
Job tenure (in years) 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.017*** 0.022***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Job tenure2/100 -0.022*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.027*** -0.038***
[0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
1 if part-time -0.065*** -0.137*** -0.198*** -0.198*** -0.340***
[0.016] [0.020] [0.018] [0.024] [0.024]
Contractual weekly hours 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.010***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Constant 5.946*** 6.179*** 6.482*** 8.588*** 8.822***
[0.071] [0.075] [0.071] [0.081] [0.080]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,928 6,866 6,328 6,867 6,330
R-squared 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.62
The dependent variable in Columns (1) to (3) is log gross monthly labour earnings (taken from
the generated files vpgen, wpgen and xpgen of the SOEP). The dependent variable in Columns
(4) and (5) is log annual individual labour earnings (taken from the equivalent files of the SOEP).
The sample is restricted to the gainfully employed; farmers, self-employed, those in compulsory
military or community service are excluded. The measure of positive reciprocity is the individual’s
average level of agreement to three statements concerning, respectively, willingness to return a
favour, to go out of the way to help somebody who was kind, and undergo personal costs to help
someone who was helpful before. The measure of negative reciprocity reflects average agreement
to statements concerning willingness to take revenge for a serious wrong, to retaliate for being
put in a difficult position, and to respond to an insult with an insult. Answers are always on
a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “does not apply to me at all” and 7 means “applies to me
perfectly”. Regressions in all columns include indicator variables for firm size (5-19, 20-99, 100-199,
200-1999, more than 2000 employees), industrial sector (agriculture energy, mining, manufacturing,
construction, trade, transport, bank and insurance), and occupational status in public and private
employment. Detailed results for all control variables s are available upon request. Robust standard
errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level; ***, **, * indicate significance at 1-,
5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 3: Reciprocity and Unemployment
Dependent variable: 1 if unemployed in 2005 1 if unemployed in 2006 1 if unemployed in 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positive reciprocity -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.006** -0.005* -0.005* -0.005*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Negative reciprocity 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Years of education 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.019*** 0.019***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.004]
1 if female -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.014***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Age (in years) 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Lived in GDR in 1989 0.083*** 0.011 0.085*** 0.032*** 0.073*** 0.019*
[0.008] [0.011] [0.009] [0.012] [0.009] [0.011]
Lived abroad in 1989 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.047*** 0.080*** 0.073***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.020] [0.019]
Residence in 1989 missing 0.099 0.055 0.039 0.007 0.143 0.094
[0.071] [0.062] [0.056] [0.045] [0.093] [0.081]
German nationality -0.030** -0.036** -0.043*** -0.049*** -0.005 -0.008
[0.013] [0.014] [0.015] [0.016] [0.012] [0.013]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region (Bundesland) dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 12,640 12,640 11,460 11,460 10,740 10,740
Pseudo R-squared 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12
The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the respondent is unemployed at the survey date in 2005
(Columns (1) and (2)), 2006 (Columns (3) and (4)), or 2007 (Columns (5) and (6)). Estimates are
Probit marginal effects estimates. The measure of positive reciprocity is the individual’s average level
of agreement to three statements concerning, respectively, willingness to return a favour, to go out of
the way to help somebody who was kind, and undergo personal costs to help someone who was helpful
before. The measure of negative reciprocity reflects average agreement to statements concerning
willingness to take revenge for a serious wrong, to retaliate for being put in a difficult position, and
to respond to an insult with an insult. Answers are always on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means
“does not apply to me at all” and 7 means “applies to me perfectly”. Additional other controls are
marital status, number of children in the household, and religious background. All regressions include
indicator variables for marital status (married, widowed, divorced), for the number of children in the
household (1 child, 2 children, 3 children, 4 or more children), and categorical variables for religion
(catholic, other Christian, other religion, no confession, religion missing). We use information on
religion from the 2003 wave in Columns (1)-(4). Religion information from the 2007 survey is used in
Columns (5) and (6). An additional religion category (islamic), that was previously subsumed in the
category “other religion” was defined in 2007. Regressions in Columns (2), (4) and (6) include dummy
variables for the state (Bundesland) of residence (Saarland and Rhineland-Palatinate are subsumed
in one category). Robust standard errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level; ***,
**, * indicate significance at 1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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Table 4: Overall Success of Homo Reciprocans
Dependent Variable: Number of Friends Overall Life Satisfaction
2005 2006 2007
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Positive reciprocity 0.218*** 0.214*** 0.170*** 0.123*** 0.095***
[0.038] [0.038] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016]
Negative reciprocity -0.057** -0.064** -0.091*** -0.074*** -0.056***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Years of education 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.006 0.009 0.014**
[0.018] [0.018] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
1 if female -0.092 -0.105* 0.055** 0.050** 0.049*
[0.062] [0.062] [0.025] [0.026] [0.026]
Age (in years) 0.012*** 0.007 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008
[0.005] [0.005] [0.002] [0.002] [0.000]
Lived in GDR in 1989 0.078 0.056 -0.448*** -0.468*** -0.427***
[0.109] [0.108] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040]
Lived abroad in 1989 -0.463** -0.438* -0.004 0.050 0.172**
[0.233] [0.230] [0.080] [0.081] [0.087]
Residence in 1989 missing -0.959*** -1.006*** 0.592 -0.115 0.643
[0.359] [0.277] [0.963] [0.672] [1.335]
Subjective health -0.283*** -0.181*** -0.818*** -0.832*** -0.876***
[0.041] [0.041] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018]
Log net annual household income 0.215*** 0.291*** 0.298*** 0.357*** 0.286***
[0.068] [0.068] [0.026] [0.026] [0.028]
1 if unemployed -0.062 -0.027 -1.001*** -0.856*** -0.806***
[0.173] [0.174] [0.075] [0.076] [0.084]
1 if non-participating 0.123 0.158 0.008 0.680*** -0.014
[0.155] [0.152] [0.060] [0.231] [0.065]
1 if retired -0.057 0.144 0.229*** 0.187*** 0.173***
[0.168] [0.170] [0.058] [0.061] [0.060]
Trust (standardized) 0.468*** 0.488*** 0.187*** 0.189*** 0.150***
[0.041] [0.041] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015]
Constant 1.463* 2.406 4.481*** 3.313*** 5.326***
[0.805] [2.582] [0.470] [0.663] [0.378]
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 15,747 15,972 16,402 15,069 13,904
R-squared 0.04 0.04
Pseudo-Log-Likelihood -29,958 -27,191 -24,907
OLS coefficient estimates in Columns (1) and (2). The dependent variable in Columns (1) and (2) is the number of close
friends and is constructed based on the answer to a question in the 2003 wave. Time-variant explanatory variables are
fixed at the values for 2003 in Column (1) and 2005 in Column (2). The dependent variable in Columns (3) to (5) is
the answer to a question on overall life satisfaction on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means “completely dissatisfied” and
10 means “completely satisfied”. Because the dependent variable is elicited in intervals, coefficients are based on interval
regression, which corrects for left and right censoring of the dependent variable. The measure of positive reciprocity is
the individual’s average level of agreement to three statements concerning, respectively, willingness to return a favour, to
go out of the way to help somebody who was kind, and undergo personal costs to help someone who was helpful before.
The measure of negative reciprocity reflects average agreement to statements concerning willingness to take revenge for
a serious wrong, to retaliate for being put in a difficult position, and to respond to an insult with an insult. Answers
are always on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “does not apply at all” and 7 means “totally applies”. The measure
for annual income is taken form the equivalent files of the SOEP and captures all income sources of the household in the
previous year (including for example, earnings, non-labour income, social support, unemployment insurance, retirement and
pension benefits and any other benefits). The other controls include parental education background (indicator variables
for completion of the Abitur by mothers and fathers), marital status, indicator variables for the number of children under
the age of 19 in the household, indicator variables for enrollment in school and different vocational education programmes,
categorical variables for labour market status and occupational status in private and public sector employment, categorical
variables for religious background, social and national background, and month of interview. The measure of trust is based
on standardized answers to a general trust question asked in the 2003 wave of the SOEP. Detailed results are available upon
request. Robust standard errors in brackets allow for clustering at the household level; ***, **, * indicate significance at
1-, 5-, and 10-percent level, respectively.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Reciprocity
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Notes: The histograms are based on answers to questions about reciprocal inclinations that were asked in
the 2005 wave of the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). Respondents were asked to indicate
on a 7-point scale how well each of the following six statements (translated from German) applies to them
personally: (1) If someone does me a favour, I am prepared to return it; (2) If I suffer a serious wrong,
I will take revenge as soon as possible, no matter what the cost; (3) If somebody puts me in a difficult
position, I will do the same to him/her; (4) I go out of my way to help somebody who has been kind to me
before; (5) If somebody offends me, I will offend him/her back; (6) I am ready to undergo personal costs to
help somebody who helped me before. An answer of 1 on the scale means: “does not apply to me at all”
and choosing 7 means: “applies to me perfectly”. The histograms show the distributions of responses to
each of the six reciprocity measures of the 20,774 individuals who responded to all six reciprocity measures.
Positive reciprocity measures (responses to questions (2), (3) and (5)) are shown in the left-hand panels,
negative reciprocity measures (responses to questions (1), (4) and (6)) in the right-hand panel.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Reciprocity
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Notes: The histograms show the distributions of positive and negative reciprocity in the sample of the
20,774 individuals who responded to all six reciprocity measures in the 2005 wave of the SOEP. For each
individual, the degree of positive reciprocity is calculated by taking the simple average of responses to the
three positive reciprocity measures. Negative reciprocity is based on the average across the three negative
reciprocity measures. See notes to Figure 1 for the wording of the reciprocity questions.
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